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AGREED BOUNDARIES AND BOUNDARIES BY
ACQUIESCENCE: THE NEED FOR A STRAIGHT
LINE FROM THE COURTS
As is usual, boundary disputes are generally between friends who
become enemies and the facts are detailed and somewhat confusing, all
of which give rise to the conflicting principles of law.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The resolution of boundary disputes in American property law has
been a source of much confusion and dispute. Many jurists, therefore,
have been prompted to either explain or excuse the state of the law in the
area,2 sometimes adding further to the confusion in the process. One
particularly troublesome branch of the law dealing with boundary dis-
putes is the doctrine of agreed boundaries and boundaries by acquies-
cence.' Succinctly stated, the doctrine of agreed boundaries and bound-
aries by acquiescence provides:
Where the boundary line between two adjoining landowners is uncer-
tain, they may agree on a division line between them, and when
1. Geduhn v. Kolar, 202 N.W.2d 272, 273 (Wis. 1972).
2. Other excuses, explanations, and reasons have been propounded though none have
supplied a satisfactory answer. See, e.g., Browder, The Practical Location of Boundaries,
56 MicH. L. REV. 487 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Browder]. Browder has observed:
Not fully recognizing that the problem is probably sui generis, the courts have
sought to adapt to their purpose several disparate existing doctrines. This has led
to disagreement and misunderstanding of the nature of the problem or the legal
theory or theories which would adequately explain or support judicial action.
Vagueness of theory has led in turn to vagueness and disagreement on the facts
which will merit judicial recognition.
Id. at 489.
3. These are two of the more common labels used in describing this legal phenome-
non, but, like the scope of the doctrine, the titles used to identify it are broad and
diverse. E.g., Kincaid v. Peterson, 297 P. 333, 336 (Ore. 1931) ("practical location");
King v. Mabry, 71 Tenn. 237, 246 (1939) ("conventional line"). See Buza v.
Wojtalewiez, 180 N.W.2d 556, 561 (Wis. 1970) ("estoppel"). Note that estoppel was
often treated as a completely separate doctrine. See, e.g., Biddle Boggs v. Merced
Mining Co., 14 Cal. 279 (1859); Browder, supra note 2, at 519-25; Note, Boundary
Litigation in California, 11 STAN. L. REV. 720, 728-32 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
Boundary Litigation]. In other instances, in order to mask incomplete analysis, the
courts applied estoppel though the full elements of the estoppel doctrine were lacking.
E.g., Browder, supra note 2, at 498. In California the doctrine is usually referred to as
"agreed boundaries," although often the term "boundaries by acquiescence" is used as a
substitute.
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executed each will own up to this line as if it were a natural boundary,
or as if their deeds or grants call for it .... An agreement may be
implied as well as expressed, and, although possession or acquiescence
may be necessary,. . . it has been held that it becomes binding from
the time it is made. 4
When an agreed boundary is found to exist, it becomes the true line
and is binding on the parties and their successors in interest.5 The
courts generally look with favor on these agreements since they serve
to "secure repose, to prevent strife and disputes concerning boundaries,
and make titles permanent and stable."'  The English common law
recognized the doctrine from an early date,8 and it has been utilized by
American courts since their inception.9
Despite the age-old nature of the doctrine of agreed boundaries and
boundaries by acquiescence, the many years of use did not lead to a
refinement of the doctrine and its elements. Instead, the courts plunged
into a judicial morass, attempting to resolve cases in a piecemeal fash-
ion, and largely ignoring precedent as a result of either misperception"0
or equitable concerns.': Some appellate courts refused to confront the
4. 11 C.J.S. Boundaries § 64 (1938).
5. E.g., Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church, 51 Cal. 2d 702, 708-09, 336 P.2d 525, 529
(1959), citing Young v. Blakeman, 153 Cal. 477, 482, 95 P. 888, 890 (1908); White v.
Spreckels, 75 Cal. 610, 616, 17 P. 715, 717 (1888); Sneed v. Osborn, 25 Cal. 619, 630-
31 (1864); Janes v. LeDeit, 228 Cal. App. 2d 474, 481-82, 39 Cal. Rptr. 559, 564-65
(1964).
6. E.g., Loustalot v. McKeel, 157 Cal. 634, 642-43, 108 P. 707, 711 (1910); Aborigine
Lumber Co. v. Hyman, 245 Cal. App. 2d 938, 941, 54 Cal. Rptr. 371, 373 (1966);
Crook v. Leinenweaver, 100 Cal. App. 2d 790, 792, 224 P.2d 891, 892 (1950).
7. Young v. Blakeman, 153 Cal. 477, 482, 95 P. 880, 890 (1908); accord, Mello v.
Weaver, 36 Cal. 2d 456, 460, 244 P.2d 691, 693 (1950); Minson Co. v. Aviation
Finance, 38 Cal. App. 3d 489, 494, 113 Cal. Rptr. 223, 226 (1974); Janes v. LeDeit, 228
Cal. App. 2d 474, 481, 39 Cal. Rptr. 559, 564 (1964).
8. E.g., Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 27 Eng. Rep. 1132 (Ch. 1750).
9. See, e.g., Boyd v. Graves, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 513 (1819); Brown v. Leete, 2 F.
440 (C.C.D. Nev. 1880); Smith v. Robarts, 2 Cal. Unrep. 604, 9 P. 104 (1885); Sneed
v. Osborn, 25 Cal. 619 (1864); Sheldon v. Atkinson, 16 P. 68 (Kan. 1887); Lennox v.
Hendricks, 4 P. 515 (Ore. 1884); Perkins v. Gary, 3 S. & R. 327 (Pa. 1817); Houston
v. Matthews, 9 Tenn. 116 (1826).
10. See, e.g., Buckner v. Russell, 331 P.2d 401 (Okla. 1958), which stated that
Johnson v. Whelan, 98 P.2d 1103 (Okla. 1940), overruled Reynolds v. Wall, 72 P.2d 505
(Okla. 1937). Although the wording in Johnson was somewhat ambiguous, upon a
careful reading it is clear that Reynolds was not overruled.
11. See, e.g., Roman v. Ries, 259 Cal. App. 2d 65, 66 Cal. Rptr. 120 (1968), which
stated:
It is pointed out that there is no precedent for allowing a party the benefit of
part, but not all, of an agreed boundary. Such is probably so; the case before us
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confused nature of the law of agreed boundaries and boundaries by
acquiescence, and automatically upheld the decisions made in the trial
courts. 12 As a result, the doctrine that developed was confused, and the
applications of its principles were varied and often irreconcilable.
The confusion was a result of many factors, but one which seemed to
contribute heavily was the failure to adequately analyze the facts of each
case. Factual situations determine the applicability of the doctrine of
agreed boundaries and boundaries by acquiescence. Too often, how-
ever, courts allowed factual differences to blur a consistent appli-
cation of the doctrine.'" This, in turn, clouded the doctrine itself,
making it all the more difficult for later uniform applications of its
principles. Furthermore, the simplicity with which the doctrine often
was stated contributed to the confusion. The definitions provided
referred both to the agreement and the acquiescence; as will be noted
subsequently,1 4 these terms were variously interpreted as completely
distinct, as interwoven, or as simply synonymous.
II. ERNE v. TRm TY LUTHERAN Cm cRH:
THE BASIC CALIFORNIA DOCTRINE
The California courts were prime contributors to the confusion sur-
rounding agreed boundaries and boundaries by acquiescence. Early
settlement was erratic and frenzied 15 and often led to inaccuracies in
surveys1 and recordation. Such settlement produced an enormous
is a novel one. But there are no fixed rules limiting the power of equity in dealing
with subject matters coming generally within its jurisdiction ....
Id. at 70, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
12. Fallert v. Hamilton, 109 Cal. App. 2d 399, 240 P.2d 1007 (1952), stated:
It is not our duty to determine whether the evidence might have supported a finding
contrary to the one reached by the trial court. It is our conclusion that it cannot
be said, as a matter of law, that an agreed boundary line was conclusively estab-
lished by the evidence. In view of the inferences and deductions that might be al-
lowed to be drawn from the evidence produced, it cannot be said that there is not
sufficient evidence to support the court's finding.
Id. at 404, 240 P.2d at 1010. See Boundary Litigation, supra note 3, at 726, citing Note,
Prescription: Presumption of Adverse User, 34 CALIF. L. REV. 445 (1946).
13. Cf. note 2 supra.
14. See generally notes 76-,88 infra and accompanying text.
15. Note that many problems were caused by the numerous Mexican land grants. See,
e.g., Grants Pass Land & Water Co. v. Brown, 168 Cal. 456, 143 P. 754 (1914);
Columbet v. Pacheco, 48 Cal. 395 (1874); Ross v. Burkhard Investment Co., 90 Cal.
App. 201, 265 P. 982 (1928).
16. E.g., Hannah v. Pogue, 23 Cal. 2d 849, 147 P.2d 572 (1944), stated:
The courts have recognized such boundaries because the early surveys in the state
were most uncertain, and in later years the monuments and landmarks they de-
scribed could not be found.
19761
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volume of boundary dispute cases, presenting California courts a prime
opportunity to formulate a coherent doctrine of agreed boundaries and
boundaries by acquiescence. Nevertheless, the courts initially ab-
stained, 17 and the consequence was a murky and unsettled doctrine. Yet,
not inaccurately, California now has gained a reputation for being
judicially progressive. An analysis of its cases will reveal that the
former confusion has all but died, and the California courts have
established, and are continuing to promulgate, a definitive doctrine of
agreed boundaries and boundaries by acquiescence.
The supreme court case of Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church18 is the
beginning point' 9 for any analysis of the doctrine of agreed boundaries
or boundaries by acquiescence in California. In Ernie, the parties
owned adjacent lots which shared a common boundary, the defendant's
lot located just west of the plaintiff's lot. In 1925, the defendant's
predecessor purchased the lot and, as a result of a survey, erroneously
went into possession of a strip of land legally part of the plaintiff's
adjacent eastern lot. The defendant's predecessor later erected a build-
ing on the strip and placed a fence on what he believed was his eastern
boundary. The defendant purchased the lot in the belief that the strip
was included in it and he continuously used the land until the plaintiff
discovered the boundary error and claimed title to the strip. Four years
later, the plaintiff brought suit.20 The lower court quieted title in the
defendant on the basis of California Code of Civil Procedure sections
318 and 338(2)21 and laches. 22
Id. at 857, 147 P.2d at 576, citing Loeb, The Establishment of Boundaries by Practical
Location, 4 CALEF. L. REv. 179 (1916).
17. E.g., Boundary Litigation, supra note 3.
18. 51 Cal. 2d 702, 336 P.2d 525 (1959).
19. Actually, the most recent California Supreme Court case is French v. Brinkman,
60 Cal. 2d 547, 387 P.2d 1, 35 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1963). However, this was a minor case
in terms of the solidification of the law in this area, as it dealt with only one element of
boundaries by acquiescence. Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church, 51 Cal. 2d 702, 336
P.2d (1951), on the other hand, contained an extensive discussion of the doctrine and
various elements thereof.
20. 51 Cal. 2d 702, 705-06, 336 P.2d 525, 526-27 (1959). The construction on the
strip by defendant's predecessor was quite substantial. It included a rectory with a
concrete foundation and a sidewalk as well as a firmly embedded fence. The predecessor
continuously and exclusively possessed the strip from 1926 to 1942; the defendant
purchased it in 1942 and used the strip until 1952. Plaintiff purchased his lot in 1944
and the description in his deed included the land in dispute. Neither the defendant nor
his predecessor ever used the strip although the plaintiff paid taxes on it.
21. CAL. Civ. PRo. CoDE § 318 (West Supp. 1954) provides:
No action for the recovery of real property, or for the recovery of the possession
thereof, can be maintained, unless it appear that the plaintiff, his ancestor, predeces-
640 [Vol. 9
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The supreme court affirmed, relying instead on the doctrine of agreed
boundaries.23 Initially, the court enumerated the judicially estab-
lished 24 requirements for the application of this doctrine. The court
stated that there must be
an uncertainty as to the true boundary line, an agreement between the
coterminous owners fixing the line, and acceptance and acquiescence in
the line so fixed for a period equal to the statute of limitations or under
such circumstances that substantial loss would be caused by a change of
its position.25
The court then proceeded to discuss each element individually. In
discussing the nature of "uncertainty" the court stated:
It is not required that the true location be absolutely unascertainable;
that an accurate survey from the calls in the deed is possible, [sic], 26
or that the uncertainty should appear from the deeds. The line may be
founded on a mistake.
27
The court further stated that the uncertainty, does not have to be blatant,
but can be inferred from the circumstances. This inference will arise if
a definite line was designated and if such line was accepted for a
considerable length of time. Additionally, the court approved the
inference of uncertainty arising from construction of the improvements,
and the owners subsequent agreement that the designated line would
become the true boundary.
28
Next the court discussed the concept of agreement, accepting, but not
requiring, an express agreement. It broadened the scope of what
constitutes an agreement, stating:
The court may infer that there was an agreement between the cotermi-
nous owners ensuing from uncertainty or a dispute, from the long-
standing acceptance of a fence as a boundary between their lands.2 9
sor, or grantor, was seized or possessed of the property in question, within five years
before the commencement of the action.
CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 338(2) (West Supp. 1975) provides that "[ain action for trespass
upon or injury to real property" must be brought within three years.
22. 51 Cal. 2d at 706, 336 P.2d at 527.
23. Id. at 705-06, 336 P.2d at 526-27.
24. Id. at 707, 336 P.2d at 528.
25. Id.
26. It seems that the court intended to say "impossible" rather than "possible."
27. 51 Cal. 2d at 707-08, 336 P.2d at 528 (citations omitted).
28. Id. at 708, 336 P.2d at 528. Note that such inference was largely interwoven with
the concept of substantial loss. See generally notes 107-27 infra and accompanying text.
29. 5 Cal. 2d at 708, 336 P.2d at 528.
1976]
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Finally, the statute of limitations/"substantial loss" element was exam-
ined. The statute of limitations, five years in agreed boundaries ac-
tions,80 was met in this case; therefore, substantial loss was not discussed
extensively. However, the court implied that such loss would result if
the defendant were required to give up possession of the disputed strip,
due to the considerable improvements the defendant had made on the
land.31 Concluding that all of the elements had been established, the
court found an agreed boundary."
The importance of Ernie arises not from its ultimate disposition but
from the discussion of the required elements and the types and degrees
of proof found to be acceptable to prove them. In contrast to earlier
confusion, the majority33 delineated straightforward requirements which
were supported by precedent. 4 As the court indicated, the equities
usually favor maintaining a boundary line where located by the par-
ties. 35 The court looked to the reality of the circumstances allowing
reasonable inferences and not requiring direct evidence of agreement or
uncertainty where such was impossible.3 6 The existence of an agreed
boundary under Ernie may be proved without direct evidence of occur-
rences which often transpired too far in the past to generate such
evidence. Yet, the amount of evidence required is sufficient to show the
existence of an agreed boundary and to prevent the unfair taking of
land.
The elements set forth in Ernie are such that the rights of both parties
to a boundary dispute are protected as much as is reasonably possible.
According to Ernie, as long as minimum requirements are met, agreed
boundaries will be upheld. The ful import of this case, however, can
be realized only in the context of an examination and comparison of the
30. CAL. CIV. PRo. CODE § 318 (West 1954); Kofl v. Dunn, 176 Cal. App. 2d 204, 1
Cal. Rptr. 278 (1959).
31. 51 Cal. 2d at 708, 336 P.2d at 528. The improvements included a rectory, a
sidewalk, and a fence. Id. See note 20 supra.
32. Id. at 708, 336 P.2d at 529.
33. Justice Shenk wrote the opinion. Chief Justice Gibson and Justices Carter,
Traynor, Spence and Schauer concurred, while only Justice McComb dissented.
34. See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text.
35. 51 Cal. 2d 702, 709, 336 P.2d 525, 529 (1959).
36. If there was direct evidence to the contrary, then the use of inferences approved
by the Ernie court would be improper; presumably future courts would allow the facts
rather than the inferences to govern. Cottle v. Gibson, 200 Cal. App. 2d 1, 9, 19 Cal.
Rptr. 82, 87 (1962); Kirkegaard v. McLain, 199 Cal. App. 2d 484, 491, 18 Cal. Rptr.
641, 643-44 (1962). But see Dooley's Hardware Mart v. Trigg, 270 Cal. App. 2d 337,
340, 75 Cal. Rptr. 745, 748 (1969), which questionably limited Ernie to its facts.
[Vol. 9
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confusion in prior cases and the relative ease with which cases subse-
quent to Ernie have been decided.
m. THE ELEMENTS OF AGREED BoUNDARiES AND
BOUNDARImS BY ACQUmSCENCE
A. Uncertainty
A prime requisite for the invocation and application of the doctrine of
agreed boundaries and boundaries by acquiescence is that the boundary
line be uncertain.17 Ernie dealt extensively with uncertainty and sanc-
tioned a liberal interpretation of it. In so doing it adhered to the basic
meaning of uncertainty defined earlier by the court in Nusbickel v.
Stevens Ranch Co.38 which stated:
The word "uncertainty" is used ...to convey the idea that at the
time of the location of the division line neither of the coterminous
owners knew the true position of the line on the ground.3 9
According to the Ernie court, the basic criterion for uncertainty is
lack of knowledge of the true line. This lack of knowledge may be
founded on mistake. Further, the true location of the line need not be
absolutely unascertainable, an accurate survey from the calls of the deed
need not be impossible, nor does uncertainty even have to appear in the
deed. 40 Thus Ernie clearly defined the scope of uncertainty.
Prior to Ernie there was no clear definition of uncertainty even
though the very early cases set out a fairly consistent approach to this
requirement. For instance, in Sneed v. Osborn,4 the California Su-
preme Court stated that if the parties agreed to or acquiesced in a line
for a proper length of time, it was irrelevant that they had acted as a re-
sult of mistake of ignorance as to the true line, or that the line agreed to
was not correct as per the calls of the deed.42 Thus the court established
that it was the fact, not the nature and origin, of uncertainty that was
important. For the next fifty years most courts continued to rely on this
reasoning."
37. See notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text.
38. 187 Cal. 15, 200 P. at 651 (1921).
39. Id. at 19, 200 P. at 653.
40. See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
41. 25 Cal. 619 (1864).
42. Id. at 626.
43. E.g., Loustalot v. McKeel, 157 Cal. 634, 643, 108 P. 707, 711 (1910) (if parties
mistaken in an agreement could invalidate established line, then no stability in such
agreements); Helm v. Wilson, 76 Cal. 476, 485, 18 P. 604, 608 (1888) (dispute not
element of doctrine); Cooper v. Vierra, 559 Cal. 282, 23 (1,881) (line founded as result
1976]
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The supreme court continued to refine the requirement of uncertainty
in Loustalot v. McKeel."4 There the court found that definite uncer-
tainty between the parties was present because the respective deeds
contained discrepancies in the description of the property.4 5 Even if the
line could have been ascertained, whether by survey or by some other
acceptable method, the fact that the parties were uncertain about the
true location of the line satisfied the requirement.46 In effect the court
held that the parties were under no duty to find the true boundary line.
Further, following Sneed, the court stated that it was immaterial wheth-
er the parties were correct in believing that the line was exactly where
they had established it.47 Doubt and agreement based on such doubt
were sufficient to satisfy the uncertainty requirement.48 A year later, in
Price v. DeReyes,4 9 -the court eliminated the requirement of a dispute as
to the location of the true boundary, holding that uncertainty alone was
sufficient. 0
A final clarification, prior to Ernie, of the uncertainty requirement
was provided in Clapp v. Churchill,51 where, for the first time, the court
specifically required that both parties be uncertain.52  Additionally,
of mistake as to true line upheld); Biggins v. Champlin, 59 Cal. 113, 116 (1881) (makes
no difference parties erred as to true line).
Superficially, the early case of Smith v. Robarts, 2 Cal. Unrep. 604, 9 P. 104 (1885),
appears to contradict the rule set out in Sneed. On careful examination, however, it
squares with and cited Sneed as well as Biggins v. Champlin, 59 Cal. 113 (1881), as the
authorities for the doctrine of agreed boundaries. The facts in Smith did not lend
themselves to an application of the Sneed and Biggins doctrine. 'In Smith, both parties,
though agreeing to the placement of a fence, recognized that the fence was not on the
true boundary line and did not agree to establish a definite boundary by placement of the
fence. Since there was no agreement to locate the boundary, the mistake doctrine was
inapplicable. 2 Cal. Unrep. at 605-06, 9 P. at 105-06.
44. 157 Cal. 634, 108 P. 707 (1910).
45. Id. at 641, 108 P. at 710.
46. Id. at 641-42, 109 P. at 710-11.
47. Id. at 642, 108 P. at 711.
48. Id., 108 P. at 710-11.
49. 161 Cal. 484, 119 P. 893 (1911).
50. Id. at 489, 119 P. at 895, citing Helm v. Wilson, 76 Cal. 476, 485, 18 P. 604, 608
(1888); accord, Schwab v. Donovan, 165 Cal. 360, 363-64, 132 P. 447 (1913).
51. 164 Cal. 741, 130 P. 1061 (1913).
52. Id. at 745, 130 P. at 1062. This was to prevent an illegal transfer of land. If one
or both parties knew the true location of the boundary line, a transfer of land not
pursuant to a written deed or contract was void under the Statute of Frauds. Grants
Pass Land & Water Co. v. Brown, 168 Cal. 456, 459, 143 P. 754, 756 (1914); Lewis v.
Ogram, 149 Cal. 505, 87 P. 60 (1906). Where both parties were uncertain, the courts
avoided the Statute of Frauds problem by holding that such agreements were not
transfers of land but only defined the land described in the deed. In Young V.
Blakeman, 153 Cal. 477, 95 P. 888 (1908), the court stated:
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anticipating Ernie by forty-six years, the court held that uncertainty
could be inferred in the absence of "proved fact to the contrary-
namely that there was no question or doubt or dispute between both
parties over the boundary."58 In a further extension, the court conclud-
ed that even though the uncertainty was inferred, it was nevertheless
permissible to infer an agreement. 4
These cases harmonized with each other, and stated principles later
relied upon in Ernie. Yet in the very year that Clapp was decided, an
appellate court wrote the first in a series of contrary and misleading
cases, Janke v. McMahon 5 Completely ignoring supreme court prece-
dent, Janke directly contradicted Sneed and Loustalot and relied on
Wisconsin law for authority for the ultimate disposition of the case.5
The Janke court held that there was no uncertainty and hence no agreed
boundary; it so held even though the parties were ignorant as to the true
location of the boundary." The court focused on the fact that the
parties had the means of discovering the true line, i.e., a survey based on
the deed.5 s Thus the parties' ignorance of their error in determining the
true location of the line negated a finding of uncertainty.5 9 As a result
neither party was estopped from claiming to the correct line. 0
In light of prior California cases, the Janke court interpreted uncer-
tainty too narrowly. Although the parties were unaware of the mistake,
the absence of awareness did not negate the fact that there was actual
It is stated by the authorities that the line so agreed on becomes in legal effect the
true line, that the agreement as to the line may be in parol and that it does not
operate to convey title to the land which may lie between the agreed line and the
true line, but that it fixes the line itself and the description [in the deed] carries
title up to the agreed line, regardless of its accuracy; that the agreement as to the
line is not in violation of the statute of frauds, [sic] because it does not transfer
title; that the parties hold up to the agreed line by virtue of their original deeds
and not by virtue of the parol agreement; that "the division line when thus estab-
lished, attaches itself to the deeds of the respective parties, and simply defines, not
adds to, the lands described in each deed," and that if more is thus given to one
than the calls of his deed actually requires, he "holds the excess by the same tenure
that he holds the main body of his lands."
Id. at 482-83, 95 P. at 890; accord, Loustalot v. McKeel, 157 Cal. 634, 643, 108 P. 707,
711 (1910); Dierssen v. Nelson, 138 Cal. 394, 398, 71 P. 456, 457 (1903); Cavanaugh
v. Jackson, 91 Cal. 580, 583, 27 P. 931, 932 (1891); Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 27 Eng.
Rep. 1132, 1135 (Ch. 1750).
53. 164 Cal. 741, 746, 130 P. 1061, 1063 (1913).
54. Id.
55. 21 Cal. App. 781, 133 P. 21 (1913).
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uncertainty.6 1 The Janke decision, which retained its own peculiar
following,62 was unfortunate because it contributed significantly to the
61. Sneed and Loustalot specifically stated that mistake satisfied the requirement of
uncertainty. See notes 41-43, 44-48 supra and accompanying text. A realistic appraisal
of the facts in Janke demonstrates that uncertainty was present in that case. In Janke,
the defendant's father obtained his lot in 1862 and built a house and fence thereon, both
of which encroached on a strip of land adjacent to the east. There was no evidence that
the defendant's father was aware of such encroachment. In 1890, the defendant became
owner of this lot. The plaintiff never had possession of the disputed land. Though
there was no specific agreement, the plaintiff did not claim the strip as her own until
1907. Further, there was no express uncertainty or dispute; however, without facts to
the contrary, it must be assumed that the defendant's father was uncertain as to the true
line when he made the improvements. Also, the plaintiff must have been uncertain since
such a long time elapsed before she realized the discrepancies between her deed and the
line up to which the defendant built.
62. Janke was primarily followed by the appellate courts. Many cases using the Janke
rationale were decided solely on the issue of uncertainty, the erroneous principle being
the turning point of the case. E.g., Prav. Bradshaw, 121 Cal. App. 2d 267, 263 P. 2d 52
(1953) (actual agreement present, but since true line properly described in deed, court
found no uncertainty and therefore no agreed boundary); Rast v. Fischer, 107 Cal. App.
2d 129, 236 P.2d 393 (1951) (actual agreement, but because parties believed line agreed
to was correct court found no uncertainty).
In Williams v. Barnett, 135 Cal. App. 2d 607, 612, 287 P.2d 789, 792 (1955), the
court superficially appeared to base its decision on two findings: the line allegedly
agreed to was not marked, and there was no uncertainty. However, the facts were that
the plaintiff had occupied the land in dispute, building a garage on it, and that thirty to
forty year old stakes, though of unknown origin, had marked the line up to where the
plaintiff had occupied. Id. at 610-11, 287 P.2d at 791. Therefore, the court must have
been persuaded by what it considered lack of uncertainty.
Contrary to Loustalot (supra note 55 and accompanying text) the Williams court
believed that landowners had a duty to be familiar with the terms of their deeds. Citing
Janke, 21 Cal. App. at 788, 133 P. at 24, the court stated that if a landowner "did not
actually know the extent of his property and had the means of knowledge within reach,
he would not be heard to say that a fence was located upon an accepted division line."
135 Cal. App. 2d at 612, 287 P.2d at 792. Following Janke, the court then stated that a
boundary was certain when it could be made certain from the deed; a mistaken
acquiescence in an incorrect boundary was a mistake binding neither party. Id.; accord,
Meacci v. Kochergen, 141 Cal. App. 2d 207, 296 P.2d 573 (1956).
Other cases intoned the "Janke rule" without necessity as they could have been
disposed of an alternative grounds. E.g., Garret v. Cook, 89 Cal. App. 2d 98, 200 P.2d
21 (1948) (party claiming agreed boundary put on virtually no case, making only
conclusory allegations in answer); Pedersen v. Reynolds, 31 Cal. App. 2d 18, 87 P.2d 51
(1939) (though court discussed lack of uncertainty due to mistake and possibility of
determination of correct line from deed, there was direct testimony by party claiming
agreed boundary that he built fence only as cattle barrier and neighbor accepted it as
such); Agmar v. Solomon, 87 Cal. App. 127, 261 P. 1029 (1927) (no evidence of
agreement). Cf. Pra v. Bradshaw, 121 Cal. App. 2d 267, 263 P.2d 52 (1953), where the
court partially may have based its decision on the fact that one party to the agreement
was 75 years old and "enfeebled by disease." Id. at 271, 263 P.2d at 54. Finally, there
was one California Supreme Court case, Huddart v. McGirk, 186 Cal. 386, 199 P. 494
(1921), which although not citing to Janke, did adopt its rationale.
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subsequent years of confusion in the California courts."3
Ernie did much to eliminate this confusion surrounding the uncer-
tainty requirement. Its clear definition of the scope of uncertainty
delineated a uniform standard which has been followed almost unani-
mously, 4 the few exceptions being easily distinguishable.65 Post-Ernie
63. Although .anke was a primary cause of confusion in the California courts, many
subsequent supreme court cases contradicted it. Mello v. Weaver, 36 Cal. 2d 456, 460,
224 P.2d 691, 693 (1950) (if only evidence of uncertainty is one party's assumption that
certain location was true line, finding of uncertainty might not be supported; in case,
more shown, and court approved inference of uncertainty from circumstances at time
boundary placed); Park v. Powers, 2 Cal. 2d 540, 599, 42 P.2d 75, 79 (1935) (dictum);
Moinz v. Peterman, 220 Cal. 429, 436, 31 P.2d 353, 365 (1934) (although coterminous
owners believed they were locating fence on true boundary line, agreed boundary upheld
as though owners uncertain). Some cases specifically attempted to refute the Janke
argument that mistake vitiated uncertainty as did lack of knowledge. E.g., Martin v.
Lopes, 28 Cal. 2d 618, 170 P.2d 881 (1946), stated:
Mhe intention of the parties not to claim except in accordance with the true line
is entirely consistent with the doctrine of agreed boundaries. The application of
the doctrine is not prevented by their belief that the fence was upon the line fixed
by the deed, nor by the circumstance that the line of the deeds could be determined
by a survey.
: . . [L]ack of knowledge by both parties of wheie the line is or should be drawn,
is all that need be taken into consideration.
Id. at 626, 170 P.2d at 886. Note, however, that the court was somewhat hesitant about
basing its holding on this rationale, since it added: "If it be assumed that some degree of
uncertainty in ascertaining the true boundary by the calls of the deed is required, there is
evidence of such uncertainty in the record." Id.; Nusbickel v. Stevens Ranch Co., 187
Cal. 15, 19, 200 P. 651, 652-53 (1921); Silva v. Azevedo, 178 Cal. 495, 498, 173 P. 929,
930 (1918), citing Price v. ,De Reyes, 161 Cal. 484, 489, 119 P. 893, 895 (1911).
Further, many appellate courts adhered to the precedent established by the supreme
court. E.g., Ball v. Harder, 167 Cal. App. 2d 168, 334, P.2d 84 (1959); Nutting v.
Hulbert & Muffly, Inc., 155 Cal. App. 2d 464, 317 P.2d 1007 (1957); Cabellero v.
Balamotis, 144 Cal. App. 2d 58, 300 P.2d 363 (1956); Morris v. Vossler, 110 Cal. App.
2d 678, 243 P.2d 43 (1952); Crook v. Leinenweaver, 100 Cal. App. 2d 790, 224 P.2d
891 (1950); Howatt v. Humboldt Milling Co., 61 Cal. App. 333, 214 P. 100 (1923); see
York v. Horn, 154 Cal. App. 2d 209, 315 P.2d 912 (1957); Madera School Dist. v.
Maggiorini, 146 Cal. App. 2d 390, 303 P.2d 803 (1956); Starry v. Lake, 135 Cal. App.
677, 28 P.2d 80 (1933); Raney v. Merritt, 73 Cal. App. 244, 238 P. 767 (1925).
64. Zachery v. McWilliams, 28 Cal. App. 3d 57, 61, 104 Cal. Rptr. 293, 295 (1972),
discussed the inconsistencies in California cases, specifically noting the disagreement as
to whether mistake is sufficient to meet the uncertainty requirement. This court
expressly accepted Ernie as the conclusive authority. Janes v. LeDeit, 228 Cal. App. 2d
474, 39 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1964), stated that Ernie, "[als the latest expression by the
Supreme Court, . . . appears to be the true and correct rule in California." Id. at 481
n.8, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 564 n.8.
65. E.g., Schoenfeld v. Pritzker, 257 Cal. App. 2d 117, 64 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1967), in
reliance on mediocre secondary authority (8 CAL. JUR. 2d, Boundaries § 38, at 761-63
(1963)) found that there was no uncertainty when a true location could be ascertained
from monuments or notes. It may have been that the facts in the case were such that
equity demanded the holding that there was acquiescence. There was a twenty-five year
use of plaintiff's land by the defendant. Before the defendant began constructing
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courts upheld uncertainty based on mistake"0 or lack of knowledge 7
and uncertainty proven by inference." Further, although accurate
surveys were possible, the courts held that uncertainty was not vitiated.00
B. Agreement, Acquiescence, or Acceptance
In delineating the elements of an agreed boundary, the Ernie court
required both an agreement between owners and an acceptance or
acquiescence in the line so agreed upon.70  An agreement could be
inferred based on long-standing acceptance of a marked boundary.71
The Ernie court applied these principles when it inferred an agreement
from an acquiescence which lasted twenty-six years. This was evi-
denced not only by fences "which might in and of themselves be of an
permanent improvements on it, the plaintiff notified him of the error. Further, there
was no agreement establishing a boundary, and the defendant never intended to claim
beyond his own land. Theoretically, the court could have found a boundary by
acquiescence, but since the occupation of the land was so nominal, the court may have
believed that the equities were on the side of the true owner.
Kraus v. Griswold, 232 Cal. App. 2d 698, 43 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1965), was another
maverick case. It cited Ernie in defining the extent of uncertainty, yet in direct
opposition to Ernie it stated that there was no uncertainty when a survey from the deed
would locate the boundary correctly. Id. at 706, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 148. The facts in this
case indicate that the parties knew of the true line which had been determined by a
survey made prior to their ownership of the land. This alone contravened a finding of
uncertainty, without need for resort to suspect legal doctrines.
66. E.g., Zachery v. McWilliams, 28 Cal. App. 3d 57, 62, 104 Cal. Rptr. 293, 296
(1972); Roman v. Ries, 259 Cal. App. 2d 65, 67-68, 66 Cal. Rptr. 120, 122 (1968);
Janes v. LeDeit, 228 Cal. App. 2d 474, 482, 39 Cal. Rptr. 559, 566 (1964); see
Aborigine Lumber Co. v. Hyman, 245 Cal. App. 2d 938, 942, 54 Cal. Rptr. 371, 373-74
(1966). But see Kraus v. Griswold, 232 Cal. App. 2d 698, 705, 711, 43 Cal. Rptr. 139,
145 (1965).
67. E.g., Minson Co. v. Aviation Finance, 38 Cal. App. 3d 489, 495, 113 Cal. Rptr.
223, 227 (1974); Roman v. Ries, 259 Cal. App. 2d 65, 68, 66 Cal. Rptr. 120, 122
(1968); Aborigine Lumber Co. v. Hyman, 245 Cal. App. 2d 938, 942, 54 Cal. Rptr. 371,
373-74 (1966).
68. Zachery v. McWilliams, 28 Cal. App. 3d 57, 61-62, 104 Cal. Rptr. 293, 295
(1972); Vella v. Ratto, 17 Cal. App. 3d 737, 740-42, 95 Cal. Rptr. 72, 75 (1971)
(follows Ernie although court did not cite); Kraemer v. Superior Oil Co., 240 Cal. App.
2d 642, 652, 49 Cal. Rptr. 869, 875 (1966); Kofl v. Dunn, 176 Cal. App. 2d 204, 211, 1
Cal. Rptr. 278, 283 (1959).
69. E.g., Aborigine Lumber Co. v. Hyman, 245 Cal. App. 2d 938, 942, 54
Cal. Rptr. 371, 373 (1966); Janes v. LeDeit, 228 Cal. App. 2d 474, 481, 39 Cal. Rptr.
559, 566 (1964); see Kofl v. Dunn, 176 Cal. App. 2d 204, 209, 1 Cal. Rptr. 278, 283
(1959).
70. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
71. Id.
1976] BOUNDARIES
uncertain, temporary or equivocal nature,"7 2 but also by substantial
structures firmly embedded in the ground.73 While satisfying the re-
quirement of acquiescence, these facts also met the requirement of
agreement, the agreement being inferred from the acquiescence.74 Thus
the court's permissive language and its use of inference allowed the
element of agreement to be satisfied not only by agreement implied by.
acquiescence but also by express agreement. 5
Prior to Ernie, the courts often used inconsistent approaches in
analyzing the elements of agreement and acquiescence." Often distinc-
tions were drawn between boundaries determined by agreement and
those created by acquiescence.7 7  Although the two were seen as closely,
though never completely, interwoven, within that framework there were
many variances.
In Sneed v. Osborn,7 8 the supreme court held that as long as uncer-
tainty was present and the statute of limitations was met,79 a showing of
either agreement or acquiescence would establish the boundary.8 0 Simi-
larly, many cases stated that acquiescence was evidence of an agreement,
or that an agreement could be inferred from acquiescence in a specific
line."' However, unlike Sneed, these cases did not weigh evidence of
72. 51 Cal. 2d 702, 708, 336 P.2d 525, 528 (1959).
73. See note 20 supra.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See notes 77-88 infra and accompanying text.
77. See Browder, supra note 2; Boundary Litigation, supra note 3.
78. 25 Cal. 619 (1864).
79. Id. at 626. Note that the court did not make the statute of limitations an absolute
requirement but rather stated that it was called for only by "the better opinion." Id.
Jhis implied that a shorter length of time might be acceptable under certain circum-
stances.
80. Id. See Columbet v. Pacheco, 48 Cal. 395, 397 (1874).
81. Mello v. Weaver, 36 Cal. 2d 456, 462, 224 P.2d 691, 693 (1950); Hannah v.
Pogue, 23 Cal. 2d 849, 856, 147 P.2d 572, 576 (1944); Roberts v. Brae, 5 Cal. 2d 356,
359, 54 P.2d 698, 699 (1936); Moniz v. Peterman, 220 Cal. 429, 435, 31 P.2d 353, 356
(1934); Vowinckel v. N. Clark & Sons, 217 Cal. 258, 260, 18 P.2d 58, 59 (1933); Clapp
v. Churchill, 164 Cal. 741, 745, 130 P. 1061, 1062-63 (1913); Ball v. Harder, 167 Cal.
4 pp. 2d 168, 172, 334 P.2d 84, 87 (1959); York v. Horn, 154 Cal. App. 2d 209, 211-12,
315 P.2d 912, 914 (1957); Madera School Dist. v. Maggiorini, 146 Cal. App. 2d 390,
392, 303 P.2d 803, 804 (1956); de Escobar v. Isom, 112 Cal. App. 2d 172, 176, 245 P.2d
1105, 1107 (1952); Copely v. Eade, 81 Cal. App. 2d 592, 593, 1-84 P.2d 698, 699
(1947); Swartzbaugh v. Sargent, 30 Cal. App. 2d 467, 474-76, 86 P.2d 895, 899-900
(1939); Southern Counties Gas Co. v. Eden, 118 Cal. App. 582, 586, 5 P.2d 654, 656
(1931); Raney v. Merritt, 73 Cal. App. 2d 790, 792, 224 P.2d 891, 893-94 (1925);
Board of Trustees v. Miller, 54 Cal. App. 102, 105, 201 P. 952, 953 (1921); Perich v.
Maurer, 29 Cal. App. 293, 297-98, 155 P. 471, 472 (1915). But see Huddart v. McGirk,
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acquiescence as conclusively as evidence of a direct agreement. But
these cases did' hold that without evidence to the contrary, acquiescence
would be presumed to be based on an underlying agreement.
82
Some courts, however, found that acquiescence alone was not suffi-
cient to establish an agreement.8 3 The majority of cases actually did not
dispute that acquiescence could substitute for an express agreement, 84
though that was stated at least once.85 Rather, they held that acquies-
cence without any other element was insufficient."' A few courts held
that a boundary was not established by acquiescence in a fence or other
physical manifestation creating the appearance of a boundary when such
fence was not intended as a boundary marker.8 7  Finally the courts
often treated agreement and acquiescence as two separate elements of
one single doctrine.88
186 Cal. 386, 388-89, 199 P. 494, 495 (1921); Fallert v. Hamilton, 109 Cal. App. 2d
399, 402-03, 240 P.2d 1007, 1009-10 (1952). See also Drew v. Mumford, 160 Cal. App.
2d 271, 325 P.2d 240 (1958); Williams v. Barnett, 135 Cal. App. 2d 607, 287 P.2d 789
(1955).
82. Mello v. Weaver, 36 Cal. 2d 456, 461, 224 P.2d 691, 694 (1950); Hannah v.
Pogue, 23 Cal. 2d 849, 857, 147 P.2d 572, 576 (1944); Roberts v. Brae, 5 Cal. 2d 356,
360, 54 P.2d 698, 700 (1936). See also Board of Trustees v. Miller, 54 Cal. App. 102,
105, 201 P. 952, 953 (1921).
83. Dauberman v. Grant, 198 Cal. 586, 592, 246 P. 319, 321 (1926); Staniford v.
Trombly, 181 Cal. 372, 375, 186 P. 599, 600 (1919); Garrett v. Cook, 89 Cal. App. 2d
98, 103, 200 P.2d 21, 24 (1948); Johnson v. Buck, 7 Cal. App. 2d 197, 200-01, 46 P.2d
771, 773 (1935); Dibirt v. Bopp, 4 Cal. App. 2d 541, 543, 41 P.2d 174, 175 (1935);
Phelan v. Drescher, 92 Cal. App. 393, 397, 268 P. 464, 467 (1928); Agmar v. Solomon,
87 Cal. App. 127, 138, 261 P. 1029, 1034 (1927) (proof of agreed location should be
clear); Hill v. Schumacher, 45 Cal. App. 362, 365, 187 P. 437, 438 (1919). See, e.g.
Ross v. Burkhard Inv. Co., 90 Cal. App. 201, 208, 265 P. 982, 985 (1928).
84. See Dauberman v. Grant, 199 Cal. 5S6, 246 P. 319 (1926); Staniford v. Trombly,
181 Cal. 382, 186 P. 599 (1919); Johnson v. Buck, 7 Cal. App. 2d 197, 46 P.2d 771
(1935); Dibirt v. Bopp, 4 Cal. App. 2d 541, 41 P.2d 174 (1935); Phelan v. Drescher, 92
Cal. App. 393, 268 P. 465 (1928); Janke v. McMahon, 21 Cal. App. 781, 133 P. 21
(1813).
85. See Hill v. Schumacher, 45 Cal. App. 362, 187 P. 437 (1919).
86. E.g., Johnson v. Buck, 7 Cal. App. 2d 197, 200-01, 46 P.2d 771, 773 (1935);
Phelan v. Drescher, 92 Cal. App. 393, 397, 268 P. 465, 467 (1928). See Dauberman v.
Grant, 198 Cal. 586, 592, 246 P. 319, 321 (1926); Garrett v. Cook, 89 Cal. App. 2d 98,
102-03, 200 P.2d 21, 24 (1948); Dibirt v. Bopp, 4 Cal. App. 2d 541, 543, 41 P.2d 174,
175 (1935).
87. See, e.g., Staniford v. Trombly, 181 Cal. 372, 375, 186 P. 599, 600 (1919); Pilibos
v. Gramas, 104 Cal. App. 2d 353, 356, 231 P.2d 502, 504-05 (1951); Hill v. Schumach-
er, 45 Cal. App. 362, 365, 187 P. 437, 438 (1919).
88. E.g., Martin v. Lopes, 28 Cal. 2d 618, 625, 170 P.2d 881, 885 (1946); Nusbickel
v. Stevens Ranch Co., 187 Cal. 15, 16, 200 P. 651 (1921); Silva v. Azevedo, 178 Cal.
495, 499, 173 P. 929 (1918); Wheatley v. San Pedro, Los Angeles & Salt Lake R.R., 169
Cal. 505, 514, 147 P. 135, 13$ (1915), citing HelIm v, Wilson, 76 Cal. 476, 485, 1P,
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The distinctions created by these courts need not be viewed as
completely exclusive, but they are indicative of the confusion which
encompassed this doctrine. Yet in comparison with the confusion that
surrounded the uncertainty factor, agreement received a relatively coher-
ent interpretation and application. Thus the differences which did arise
may be more easily reconciled. The bulk of the cases required both
agreement and acquiescence.89 Usually, long acquiescence raised an
inference of an agreement. 90 Some cases seemed to modify the use of
inference by only allowing it to arise when express uncertainty was
present.91 Upon a careful reading, however, it is apparent that the
courts were not qualifying the use of an inference of agreement by
acquiescence. Rather they stated only that acquiescence alone, however
much it resembled agreement, was not enough to support a finding of an
604, 608 (1888); Schwab v. Donovan, 165 Cal. 360, 363, 132 P. 447, 449 (1913);
Young v. Blakeman, 153 Cal. 477, 481, 95 P. 888, 889-90 (1903); Steele v. Schuler, 211
Cal. App. 2d 698, 704-05, 27 Cal. Rptr. 569, 579 (1963); Shelton v. Malette, 144 Cal.
App. 2d 370, 374, 301 P.2d 18, 21 (1956); Morris v. Vossler, 110 Cal. App. 2d 678, 682,
243 P.2d 43, 46 (1952); In re Barlow, 89 Cal. App. 787, 789-90, 265 P. 394, 395 (1928).
See Frericks v. Sorensen, 113 Cal. App. 2d 759, 761, 248 P.2d 949, 951 (1952).
89. E.g., Martin v. Lopes, 28 Cal. 2d 618, 625, 170 P.2d 881, 885 (1946); Roberts v.
Brae, 5 Cal. 2d 356, 358, 54 P.2d 698, 699 (1936); Nusbickel v. Stevens Ranch Co., 187
Cal. 15, 16, 200 P. 651, 651-52 (1921); Young v. Blakeman, 153 Cal. 477, 481, 95 P.
888, 889-90 (1908); Cavanaugh v. Jackson, 91 Cal. 580, 583, 27 P. 931; White v.
Spreckels, 75 Cal. 610, 616, 17 P. 715, 717 (1888); Swartzbaugh v. Sargent, 30 Cal.
App. 2d 467, 475, 86 P.2d 895, 899 (1939); Board of Trustees v. Miller, 54 Cal. App.
102, 105, 201 P. 952, 953 (1921). It has been uniformly held that to satisfy the
agreement requirement, acquiescence must be in a fence or other monument designating
an actual boundary; acquiescence in a fence as a barrier or for some other purpose will
not suffice. Staniford v. Trombly, 181 Cal. 372, 375, 186 P. 599, 600 (1919) (fence as
cattle barrier); Lewis v. Ogram, 149 Cal. 505, 508-10, 87 P. 59, 61-62 (1906) (use of
fence to pass title to land); Dierssen v. Nelson, 138 Cal. 394, 399, 71 P. 456, 457
(1903) (fence built for temporary purposes or as result of fraud did not establish agreed
boundary); Smith v. Robarts, 2 Cal. Unrep. 604, 605, 9 P. 104, 105 (1885) (agreement
to fence but both parties knew it was built on erroneous line and did not consider
agreement binding); Quinn v. Windmiller, 67 Cal. 461, 464, 8 P. 14, 16 (1885) (fence
never agreed to as boundary).
90. Mello v. Weaver, 36 Cal. 2d 456,'460, 224 P.2d 691, 694 (1950); Hannah v.
Pogue, 23 Cal. 2d 849, 857, 147 P.2d 572, 576 (1944); Roberts v. Brae, 5 Cal. 2d 356,
359, 54 P.2d 698, 699-700 (1936); Moniz v. Peterman, 220 Cal. 429, 435, 31 P.2d 353,
356 (1934); Clapp v. Churchill, 164 Cal. 741, 745-46, 130 P. 1061, 1063 (1913); Morris
v. Vossler, 110 Cal. App. 2d 678, 681, 243 P.2d 43, 45 (1952); Copely v. Eade, 81 Cal.
App. 2d 592, 593, 184 P.2d 698, 699 (1947); Southern Counties Gas Co. v. Eden, 118
Cal. App. 582, 586, 5 P.2d 654, 656 (1931); Board of Trustees v. Miller, 54 Cal. App.
102, 104, 201 P. 952, 953 (1921).
91. E.g., Drew v. Mumford, 160 Cal. App. 2d 271, 274, 325 P.2d 240, 242 (1958);
Meacci v. Kochergen, 141 Cal. App. 2d 207, 212, 296 P.2d 573, 576 (1956); Williams v,
Barnett, 135 Cal. App. 2d 607, 612, 287 P.2d 789, 792 (1955).
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agreed boundary.92 Thus, despite a few problem areas, the agreement
requirement needed only clarification rather than a complete overhaul.
The Ernie court voiced this clarification. After Ernie, the results of a
given case could be predicted with reasonable certainty. The majority
of courts, relying on the elements enumerated and defined in Ernie,9
92. See note 91 supra. Almost every case permitting an inference of an agreement
from long acquiescence also found express uncertainty. E.g., Moniz v. Peterman, 220
Cal. 429, 31 P.2d 353 (1934); Vowinckel v. N. Clark & Sons, 217 Cal. 258, 18 P.2d 58
(1933); Ball v. Harder, 167 Cal. App. 2d 168, 334 P.2d 84 (1959); York v. Horn, 154
Cal. App. 2d 209, 315 P.2d 912 (1957); Starry v. Lake, 135 Cal. App. 677, 28 P.2d 80
(1933); Raney v. Merritt, 73 Cal. App. 244, 238 P. 787 (1925). Where acquiescence
was present, but actual uncertainty was lacking, the courts would not find an agreed
boundary. E.g., Clapp v. Churchill, 164 Cal. 741, 744, 746, 130 P. 1061, 1063 (1913);
Fallert v. Hamilton, 109 Cal. App. 2d 399, 403, 240 P.2d 1007, 1010 (1952); Johnson v.
Buck, 7 Cal. App. 2d 197, 201, 46 P.2d 771, 773 (1935); Phelan v. Drescher, 92 Cal.
App. 393, 397-98, 268 P. 465, 467 (1928).
Some courts took a more liberal view, however, and were willing to infer uncertainty
as well as agreement. E.g., Board of Trustees v. Miller, 54 Cal. App. 102, 105, 201 P.
952, 953 (1921); Perich v. Maurer, 29 Cal. App. 293, 297, 155 P. 471, 472 (1915); see
Copely v. Eade, 81 Cal. App. 2d 592, 595, 184 P.2d 698, 699-700 (1947) (long
acquiescence presumptive evidence of agreed boundary based on uncertainty; presump-
tion overborne by direct evidence).
There is a line of cases which held, in essence, that mere acquiescence in a fence or
other substantial structure did not satisfy the agreement requirement even when uncer-
tainty and all other elements actually were present. E.g., Garrett v. Cook, 89 Cal. App.
2d 98, 200 P.2d 21 (1948); Pedersen v. Reynolds, 31 Cal. App. 2d 18, 87 P.2d 51
(1939); Dibirt v. Bopp, 4 Cal., App. 2d 541, 41 P.2d 174 (1935); Agmar v. Solomon, 87
Cal. App. 127, 261 P. 1029 (1927); Hill v. Schumacher, 45 Cal. App. 362, 187 P. 437
(1919). This line of cases reflected only a minority position. It strongly conflicted
with the majority view which held that long-standing acquiescence supported an adequate
inference of agreement. Some courts had additional reasons for refusing to accept
acquiescence as agreement, and these reasons may have been the true bases for the
decisions. E.g., Garrett v. Cook, 89 Cal. App. 2d 98, 103, 200 P.2d 21, 24 (1948)
(mere acquiescence in undetermined boundary line insufficient); Pedersen v. Reynolds,
31"Cal. App. 2d 18, 25, 27, 87 P.2d 51, 55, 56 (1939) (acquiescence must be in fence as
boundary and not simply as cattle barrier); Hill v. Schumacher, 45 Cal. App. 362, 365,
187 P. 437, 438 (1919) (no evidence of reason for building a fence; possibly built to
avoid future disputes as to ownership of fence). Closely analogous to this minority
position are the few cases in which the courts flatly refused to find or infer an agreement
despite evidence to the contrary. E.g., Janke v. MeMahon, 21 Cal. App. 781, 788, 133
P. 21, 24 (1913). However, some apparently inconsistent cases can be reconciled with
the majority position. For instance, in Pra v. Bradshaw, 121 Cal. App. 2d 267, 269, 263
P.2d 52, 53 (1953), the court may have been justified in holding that the agreement
element was not established because the evidence was insufficient to support such a
finding.
93. But see Vella v. Ratto, 17 Cal. App. 3d 737, 95 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1971); Kraemer v.
Superior Oil Co., 240 Cal. App. 2d 642, 49 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1966); Link v. Cole Inv. Co.,
199 Cal. App. 2d 180, 18 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1962); Lusk v. Krejci, 187 Cal. App. 2d 553, 9
Cal. Rptr. 703 (1960). These cases ignored or neglected to cite Ernie.
BOUNDARIES
simply applied them to specific factual situations. Agreement was
readily inferred from circumstantial evidence, 94 especially long acquies-
cence in a particular line.95 Although no court directly contradicted or
overlooked the Ernie principles, a few cases failed to cite Ernie as
authority.96 Thus far only one case, Dooley's Hardware Mart v.
Trigg,9 7 specifically distinguished and limited Ernie to its facts. There
the court apparently did not approve of what it believed were relaxed
standards set by the Ernie court.98 It stated that it was not required to
infer agreements in all cases and would do so only where two elements
were present. First, that the period of acquiescence from which an
agreement was inferred was very long, and second, that there was no
specific evidence offered in rebuttal to the inference.9 9 In Dooley's
acquiescence was only for eight years, and one party testified that there
had been no agreement.' 00 Relying on the principles it had just pro-
nounced, the court refused to allow an inference of an agreement, and
thus no agreed boundary was found.' 0 '
Dooley's attempted limitation of Ernie was actually unnecessary. The
facts in Dooley's were such that the doctrine set down in Ernie was
applicable and would have prevented a finding of an agreed boundary.
In Dooley's, although a fence had been built and acquiesced in for eight
years, it was built not to mark a boundary, but only to comply with a
city ordinance requiring a fence around parking lots.' 02 The trial court
correctly decided the case by finding there was no acquiescence in the
fence as a boundary. 0 3 All prior cases required acquiescence in a fence
94. E.g., Zachery v. McWilliams, 28 Cal. App. 3d 57, 60, 104 Cal. Rptr. 293, 294
(1972); Vella v. Ratto, 17 Cal. App. 3d 737, 742, 95 Cal. Rptr. 72, 75-76 (1971);
Duncan v. Peterson, 3 Cal. App. 3d 607, 611, 83 Cal. Rptr. 744, 747 (1970); Aborigine
Lumber Co. v. Hyman, 245 Cal. App. 2d 938, 943, 54 Cal. Rptr. 371, 374 (1966);
Kraemer v. Superior Oil Co., 240 Cal. App. 2d 642, 651-52, 49 Cal. Rptr. 869, 876
(1966); Janes v. LeDeit, 228 Cal. App. 2d 474, 484, 39 Cal. Rptr. 559, 566 (1964).
95. E.g., Zachery v. McWilliams, 28 Cal. App. 3d 57, 60, 104 Cal. Rptr. 293, 294
(1922); Vella v. Ratto, 17 Cal. App. 3d 737, 742, 95 Cal. Rptr. 72, 75-76 (1971);
Duncan v. Peterson, 3 Cal. App. 3d 607, 611, 83 Cal. Rptr. 744, 747 (1970); Kraemer v.
Superior Oil Co., 240 Cal. App. 2d 642, 651, 49 Cal. Rptr. 869, 876 (1966); Janes v.
LeDeit, 228 Cal. App. 2d 474, 484, 39 Cal. Rptr. 559, 566 (1964).
96. See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
97. 270 Cal. App. 2d 337, 75 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1969).
98. Id. at 340, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 748.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 339-41, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 748-49.
102. Id. at 338, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 748.
103. Id.
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as a boundary and not for some other purpose. 10 4 While not expressly
discussed in Ernie, this requirement can be inferred from the case
despite the liberality of the elements it announced. Ernie never intimat-
ed that acquiescence in a line for purposes other than a boundary would
fulfill the agreement requirement. 1 5 It would be contravening all logic
to so hold, for the very basis and purpose of this doctrine centers on the
determination of boundaries. Thus, the Dooley's court should have
relied on the decision in the trial court. Aside from Dooley's, however,
the cases have followed Ernie."6 If such concurrence continues, Cali-
fornia will have a definitive doctrine of agreed boundaries.
C. The Statute of Limitations and Substantial Loss
One element enumerated but only superficially discussed in Ernie was
that an agreed boundary or boundary by acquiescence must be fixed for
a period equal to the statute of limitations or under such circumstances
that change of its position would cause substantial loss.'07 Acquiescence
for a period equal to the statute of limitations was not subject to
interpretation since the period was fixed by Code of Civil Procedure
section 318.108 However, it was prudent that the court stated the
substantial loss element in rather general terms. Substantial loss is an
equitable concept which courts may apply in lieu of the statute of
limitations.10 Therefore, the circumstances requiring its application
will be unique and should be left to the court's discretion. This
generalization encouraged diversity. Yet in this instance, it provided a
healthy accommodation for the equitable factors usually present in
boundary dispute cases, and unlike earlier rulings, was not the result of
legal misperceptions or changes in the doctrine itself.
There was no single, definite approach to the statute of limitations/
substantial loss issue prior to Ernie, but it was seldom a serious problem.
Cases rarely turned on this sole issue. Instead, most revolved around
findings of uncertainty, agreement, or both." 0 In fact, a few cases
104. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
105. 51 Cal. 2d 702, 708, 336 P.2d 525, 528-29 (1959).
106. See notes 93-95 supra and accompanying text.
107. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
108. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
109. Janes v. LeDeit, 228 Cal. App. 2d 474, 488, 39 Cal. Rptr. 559, 569 (1964).
110. E.g., Mello v. Weaver, 36 Cal. 2d 456, 224 P.2d 691 (1950); Hannah v. Pogue,
23 Cal. 2d 849, 147 P.2d 572 (1944); Huddart v. McGirk, 186 Cal. 386, 199 P. 494
(1921); Clapp v. Churchill, 164 Cal. 741, 130 P. 1061 (1913); Agmar v. Solomon 87




never mentioned the statute of limitations or substantial loss-1 or its
equivalent.11 2  Nevertheless, it should be noted that the statute of
limitations was met in each case where the court found an agreed
boundary or boundary by acquiescence.1
3
As an alternative to the modern doctrine of agreed boundaries, some
early courts used a general theory of estoppel which was established by
"long acquiescence." ' 4 Similarly, later decisions, though not based on
this estoppel theory, also used long acquiescence as the standard to be
met.115 In these cases acquiescence always was equal to at least the
period required by the statute of limitations,' thus creating no anoma-
lies in the outcome of the cases. Even if a court required the statute of
limitations to be met, it still often independently used long acquiescence
as strong evidence of the existence of an agreed boundary."
17
Many cases did not allow a showing of substantial loss to substitute
for the statute of limitations. 118 Such refusal, however, was of no
111. E.g., Williams v. Barnett, 135 Cal. App. 2d 607, 287 P.2d 789 (1955); Talmadge
v. Moore, 98 Cal. App. 2d 481, 220 P.2d 558 (1950).
112. Many early cases recognized concepts similar to substantial loss. E.g., Vowinck-
el v. N. Clark & Sons, 217 Cal. 258, 260-61, 18 P.2d 58, 59 (1933); citing inter alia,
Board of Trustees v. Miller, 54 Cal. App. 102, 105, 201 P. 952, 953 (1921) and Southern
Counties Gas Co. v. Eden, 118 Cal. App. 582, 586, 5 P.2d 654, 656 (1931) ("for such
length of time that neither ought to be allowed to deny the correctness of its location");
accord, Pilibos v. Gramas, 104 Cal. App. 2d 353, 356, 231 P.2d 502, 504 (1951);
Cavanaugh v. Jackson, 91 Cal. 580, 583, 27 P. 931, 932 (1891) ("for a considerable
period").
113. See note 111 supra and accompanying text.
114. Burris v. Fitch, 76 Cal. 395, 398-99, 18 P. 864, 866 (1888); Biggins v. Champlin,
59 Cal. 113, 116-17 (1881). See Columbet v. Pacheco, 48 Cal. 395, 397 (1874). See,
e.g., Copely v. Eade, 81 Cal. App. 2d 592, 595, 184 P.2d 698, 699-700 (1947).
115. E.g., Mello v. Weaver, 36 Cal. 2d 456, 461-62, 224 P.2d 691, 694 (1950) (30
years); de Escobar v. Isom, 112 Cal. App. 2d 172, 175-76, 245 P.2d 1105, 1107 (1952)
(over 70 years); see Hannah v. Pogue, 23 Cal. 2d 849, 851, 147 P.2d 572, 576 (1944)
(over 20 years); Moniz v. Peterman, 220 Cal. 429, 435, 31 P.2d 353, 356 (1934) (12
years); City of Alameda v. City of Oakland, 198 Cal. 566, 577-78, 246 P. 69, 73 (1926)
(at least 35 years); Nutting v. Hulbert & Muffly Inc., 155 Cal. App. 2d 464, 468, 317
P.2d 1007, 1009 (1957) (over 30 years); Starry v. Lake, 135 Cal. App. 677, 682-83, 28
P.2d 80, 82 (1933) (over 60 years); Perich v. Maurer, 29 Cal. App. 293, 297, 155 P.
471, 472 (1915) (40. years).
116. See note 115 supra and accompanying text.
117. E.g., Helm v. Wilson, 76 Cal. 476, 485, 18 P. 604, 608 (1888); Cooper v. Vierra,
59 Cal. 282, 283 (1881); York v. Horn, 154 Cal. App. 2d 209, 211, 315 P.2d 912, 915
(1957); Morris v. Vossler, 110 Cal. App. 2d 678, 681, 243 P.2d 43, 45 (1952); see
Phelan v. Drescher, 92 Cal. App. 393, 397-98, 268 P. 465, 467 (1928).
118. E.g., Wheatley v. San Pedro, Los Angeles & Salt Lake R.R., 169 Cal. 505, 514,
147 P. 135, 138 (1915), citing Helm v. Wilson, 76 Cal. 476, 485, 18 P. 604, 608 (1888);
Ioustalot v. McKeel, 157 Cal. 634, 641-42, 1O P. 707, 710 (1910); White v. Spreckels,
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consequence as the statute of limitations in each case was met."09 No
case has been found in which the court held against a party solely due to
failure to meet the statutory period. 2 ° An impressive number of pre-
Ernie cases provided for use of either the statute of limitations or
substantial loss. 121  These cases were precursors of Ernie's liberal and
modern view.
The vast majority of the cases subsequent to Ernie recognize substan-
tial loss as an alternative to the statute of limitations. Only a few
cases neglected to mention this alternative. 28  This omission is imma-
75 Cal. 610, 616, 17 P. 715, 717 (1888); Morris v. Vossler, 110 Cal. App. 2d 678, 682,
243 P.2d 43, 46 (1952); Phelan v. Drescher, 92 Cal. App. 393, 397-98, 268 P. 465, 467
(1928); Raney v. Merritt, 73 Cal. App. 244, 250, 238 P. 767, 769 (1925); see Martin v.
Lopes, 28 Cal. 2d 618, 170 P.2d 881 (1946) which stated:
Whether the period of acquiescence may be shortened by the construction of val-
uable improvements on the theory of estoppel or otherwise . . . are not questions
involved in this case.
Id. at 625, 170 P.2d at 885.
119. See note 117 supra and accompanying text.
120. But cf. Agmar v. Solomon, 87 Cal. App. 127, 261 P. 1029 (1927). The court,
though recognizing substantial loss as an alternative to the statute of limitations,
nevertheless neglected to discuss it. Id. at 137-38, 261 P. at 1033-34. Although the
defendant had built a house on the land in dispute, the court found there was no agreed
boundary since the statute of limitations had not been met. Id. at 136-37, 261 P. at
1033. This was not the sole basis for the decision. The court also found no agreement
by the parties. Id. at 137, 261 P. at 1034.
121. E.g., Vowinckel v. N. Clark & Sons, 217 Cal. 258, 260-61, 18 P.2d 58, 59
(1933); Nusbickel v. Stevens Ranch Co., 187 Cal. 15, 16, 200 P. 651, 652 (1921);
Grants Pass Land & Water Co. v. Brown, 168 Cal. 456, 459, 143 P. 754, 756 (1914);
Young v. Blakeman, 153 Cal. 477, 481, 95 P. 888, 890 (1908); Lewis v. Ogram, 149 Cal.
505, 508, 87 P. 60, 61 (1906); Sneed v. Osborn, 25 Cal. 619, 626-27 (1868); Steele v.
Shuler, 211 Cal. App. 2d 698, 704-05, 27 Cal. Rptr. 569, 572 (1963); Shelton v. Malette,
144 Cal. App. 2d 370, 374, 301 P.2d 18, 21 (1956); Garrett v. Cook, 89 Cal. App. 2d
98, 108, 200 P.2d 21, 24 (1948); see Silva v. Azevedo, 178 Cal. 495, 499, 173 P. 929,
(1918); Needham v. Collamer, 94 Cal. App. 2d 609, 611-12, 211 P.2d 308, 309
(1949); Board of Trustees v. Miller, 54 Cal. App. 102, 105, 201 P. 952, 953 (1921). But
see Draper v. Griffin, 61 Cal. App. 2d 281, 284, 142 P.2d 772, 774-75 (1943).
122. E.g., French v. Brinkman, 60 Cal. 2d 547, 551, 35 Cal. Rptr. 289, 292, 387 P.2d
1, 4 (1963); Zachery v. McWilliams, 28 Cal. App. 3d 57, 60, 104 Cal. Rptr. 293, 294
(1972); Duncan v. Peterson, 3 Cal. App. 3d 607, 611, 83 Cal. Rptr. 744, 746 (1970);
Dalusio v. Boone, 269 Cal. App. 2d 253, 260, 75 Cal. Rptr. 287, 292 (1969); Roman v.
Ries, 259 Cal. App. 2d 65, 67, 66 Cal. Rptr. 120, 121-22 (1960); Aborigine Lumber Co.
v. Hyman, 245 Cal. App. 2d 938, 941, 54 Cal. Rptr. 371, 373 (1966); Janes v. LeDeit,
228 Cal. App. 2d 474, 480-81, 488-89, 39 Cal. Rptr. 559, 564, 569 (1964); McCormick
v. Appleton, 225 Cal. App. 2d 591, 595, 37 Cal. Rptr. 544, 547 (1964); Fobbs v. Smith,
202 Cal. App. 2d 209, 214, 20 Cal. Rptr. 545, 548 (1962); Kirkegaard v. MeLain, 199
Cal. App. 2d 484, 488-89, 18 Cal. Rptr. 641, 643 (1962); KofI v. Dunn, 176 Cal. App.
2d 204, 209, 1 Cal. Rptr. 278, 281-82 (1949).
123. E.g., Minson Co. v. Aviation Finance, 38 Cal. App. 3d 489, 495, 113 Cal. Rptr.
223, 226 (1974); Vella v. Ratto, 17 Cal. App. 3d 737, 739, 95 Cal. Rptr. 72, 73 (1971);
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terial in those cases, since the statute of limitations was met. Yet such
omission reflected judicial carelessness and could lead again to an era of
confusion like that characterized by the pre-Ernie cases.
A few cases opted to use the "long acquiescence" theory' 24 in lieu of
the Ernie doctrine.' 2 5 Although the theory did not directly conflict with
Ernie, neither was it as broad since it failed to include the substantial
loss concept. Substantial loss can be an important factor in an agreed
boundary case, as demonstrated in Roman v. Ries." There the court
found an agreed boundary although the statute of limitations had not
been met; the court's rationale was that the defendants "would suffer
substantial loss if denied the benefit of the agreed boundary line."'12 7 As
this case once again demonstrates, it is important that the courts faith-
fully adhere to the Ernie doctrine. Ernie delineated a clear set of
requirements designed to settle boundary disputes in the most just
fashion possible. Thus, it is essential that Ernie be followed.
IV. THE RESIDUE OF UNCERTAINTY
The court in Ernie substantially eliminated the confusion regarding
agreed boundaries and boundaries by acquiescence. One omission,
however, left a residue of the instability which formerly characterized
the doctrine.' 28  Although the Ernie court found that acquiescence in a
fence led to the inference of agreement,129 it neglected to deal with the
issue of the necessity of physical designation of and possession or
improvements up to the agreed line.
Prior to Ernie, many courts required that the agreed line be "speci-
Kraemer v. Superior Oil Co., 240 Cal. App. 2d 642, 652, 49 Cal. Rptr. 869, 876 (1966).
Vella and Kraemer cited to Morris v. Vossler, 110 Cal. App. 2d 678, 682, 243 P.2d 43,
46 (1952), a case prior to Ernie, for the agreed boundary requirements. Minson
neglected to mention it, though it cited Ernie as authority.
124. See notes 114-16 supra and accompanying text.
125. Vella v. Ratto, 17 Cal. App. 3d 737, 740-42, 95 Cal. Rptr. 72, 75 (1971);
Dooley's Hardware Mart v. Trigg, 270 Cal. App. 2d 337, 340-41, 75 Cal. Rptr. 745, 748
(1969); Cottle v. Gibbon, 200 Cal. App. 2d 1, 9, 19 Cal. Rptr. 82, 87 (1962); see
Kraemer v. Superior Oil Co., 240 Cal. App. 2d 642, 653, 49 Cal. Rptr. 869, 876 (1966).
126. 259 Cal. App. 2d 65, 66 Cal. Rptr. 120 (1960). In this case, the defendants
purchased land adjoining that of the plaintiffs predecessor. Because the defendants were
uncertain as the location of the boundary, the predecessor, purporting to know the true
line, pointed it out to them. The defendants made improvements up to this agreed line
to which the predecessor acquiesced. Id., 66 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
127. Id. at 70, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
128. E.g., Aborigine Lumber Co. v. Hyman, 245 Cal. App. 2d 938, 941-42, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 371, 374 (1966). See notes 147-55 infra and accompanying text.
129. See notes 70-73 supra and accompanying text.
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fied, definite and certain."' 0  This often took the form of a physical
manifestation or marking of the agreed line.'' Some courts demanded
that substantial improvements be made on the disputed land in order to
find that an agreement had occurred.' 32  Occasionally, building up to
the agreed line was acceptable.13 3  In other cases, building up to the
agreed line was not specifically required;1 4 rather, physical marking by
130. Williams v. Barnett, 135 Cal. App. 2d 607, 612, 287 P.2d 789, 792 (1955), citing
Garrett v. Cook, 89 Cal. App. 2d 98, 103, 200 P.2d 21, 24 (1948); accord, Roberts v.
Brae, 5 Cal. 2d 356, 359, 54 P.2d 698, 699 (1936); Nusbickel v. Stevens Ranch Co., 187
Cal. 15, 16, 200 P. 651, 652 (1921); Loustalot v. McKeel, 157 Cal. 634, 640, 108 P. 707,
710 (1910); Young v. Blakeman, 153 Cal. 477, 481, 95 P. 888, 890 (1908); Cavanaugh
v. Jackson, 91 Cal. 580, 583, 27 P. 931 (1891); White v. Spreckels, 75 Cal. 610,
616, 17 P. 715, 717 (1-888); Steele v. Shuler, 211 Cal. App. 2d 698, 704, 27 Cal. Rptr.
569, 572 (1963); Meacci v. Kochergen, 141 Cal. App. 2d 207, 212-13, 296 P.2d 573, 576
(1956); Phelan v. Drescher, 92 Cal. App. 393, 397, 268 P. 465, 467 (1928); see Moniz
v. Peterman, 220 Cal. 429, 436, 31 P.2d 353, 356 (1934). Cf. Needham v. Collamer, 94
Cal. App. 2d 609, 612, 211 P.2d 308, 310 (1949). But see Carr v. Schomberg, 104
Cal. App. 2d 850, 859, 232 P.2d 597, 602 (1951).
131. E.g., Martin v. Lopes, 28 Cal. 2d 618, 623, 626, 170 P.2d 881, 884 (1946);
Roberts v. Brae, 5 Cal. 2d 356, 358, 54 P.2d 698, 699 (1936); Nusbickel v. Stevens
Ranch Co., 187 Cal. 15, 16, 200 P. 651 (1921), citing Young v. Blakeman, 153 Cal.
477, 481, 95 P. 883, 890 (1908); Silva v. Azevedo, 178 Cal. 495, 497, 173 P. 929, 930
(1918); Loustalot v. McKeel, 157 Cal. 634, 640, 108 P. 707, 710 (1910); Helm v.
Wilson, 76 Cal. 476, 485,'18 P. 604, 608 (1888); Morris v. Vossler, 110 Cal. App. 2d
678, 682, 243 P.2d 43, 45 (1952); Pilibos v. Gramas, 104 Cal. App. 2d 353, 356, 231
P.2d 502, 504 (1951); Garrett v. Cook, 89 Cal. App. 2d 98, 103, 200 P.2d 21, 24
(1948). See, e.g., Moniz v. Peterman, 220 Cal. 429, 436, 31 P.2d 353, 356 (1934);
Price v. De Reyes, 161 Cal. 484, 489, 119 P. 893, 895 (1911); White v. Spreckels, 75
Cal. 610, 616, 17 P. 710, 717 (1888); Williams v. Barnett, 135 Cal. App. 2d 608, 612,
287 P. 789, 792 (1955).
132. Pilibos v. Gramas, 104 Cal. App. 2d 353, 356, 231 P.2d 502, 504 (1951). The
court stated that substantial improvements made in reliance on mutual agreements were
sometimes considered, but were not controlling in the absence of the necessary agree-
ment. Other courts stated that parties must build up to the line designated. What type
and how much building was necessary was not elaborated upon. E.g., Nusbickel v.
Stevens Ranch Co., 187 Cal. 15, 16, 200 P. 651, 652 (1921) (in lieu of marking); Young
v. Blakeman, 153 Cal. 477, 481, 95 P. 883, 890 (1908) (in lieu of marking); see Roberts
v. Brae, 5 Cal. 2d 356, 359 (1944); Silva v. Azevedo, 178 Cal. 495, 499, 173 P. 929, 930
(1918); Williamson v. Pratt, 37 Cal. App. 363, 369, 174 P. 114, 116 (1918); Perich v.
Maurer, 29 Cal. App. 293, 297, 155 P. 471, 472 (1915).
133. E.g., Nusbickel v. Stevens Ranch Co., 187 Cal. 15, 16, 200 P. 651 (1921),
citing Young v. Blakeman, 153 Cal. 477, 481, 95 P. 883, 890 (1908); Silva v. Azevedo,
178 Cal. 495, 497, 173 P. 929, 930 (1915); Morris v. Vossler, 110 Cal. App. 2d 678,
682, 243 P.2d 43, 45 (1952); Garrett v. Cook, 89 Cal. App. 2d 98, 103, 200 P.2d 21, 24
(1948).
134. See, e.g., Loustalot v. McKeel, 157 Cal. 634, 640, 108 P. 707, 710 (1910);
Cavanaugh v. Jackson, 91 Cal. 580, 583, 27 P. 931 (1891); Helm v. Wilson, 76 Cal.
476, 485, 18 P. 604, 608 (1888); White v. Spreckels, 75 Cal. 610, 616, 17 P. 710, 717
(1888); Pilibos v. Gramas, 104 Cal. App. 2d 353, 356, 231 P.2d 502, 504 (1951).
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occupancy of the land up to the line was sufficient. 13 The majority of
cases, however, demanded both physical marking or building up to the
agreed line and occupancy to the boundary. 3 6 Additionally, a number
of cases prior to Ernie used marking, building, and occupancy as evi-
dence of the establishment of a boundary line.
137
There were two pre-Ernie cases which held that no physical marking
of the agreed line was necessary.' 38 In Needham v. Collamer3 9 the
court held that since the parties could determine the line from markers,
no further specific designation was required. 140 The court failed to cite
any authority for this proposition. Two years later, in Carr v. Schom-
berg,'4 ' the court, citing Needham, held that "there is no rigid require-
ment that the boundary must be physically marked on the surface of the
ground."'42 Both cases stressed that the line be clear to the parties and
able to be made clear to others. 43
Although Needham and Carr seemed to conflict with a majority of
pre-Ernie cases,' 44 on closer examination the conflict was superficial. In
essence, the function of marking, occupation, and improvements, wheth-
er or not specifically required, was evidence of an agreed bounda-
135. E.g., Loustalot v. McKeel, 157 Cal. 634, 640, 108 P. 707, 710 (1910); Pilibos v.
Gramas, 104 Cal. App. 2d 353, 356, 231 P.2d 502, 504 (1951).
136. E.g., Nusbickel v. Stevens Ranch Co., 187 Cal. 15, 16, 200 P. 651, 651 (1921),
citing Young v. Blakeman, 153 Cal. 473, 481, 95 P. 883, 890 (1908); Silva v. Azevedo,
178 Cal. 495, 497, 173 P. 929, 930 (1918); Price v. De Reyes, 161 Cal. 484, 489, 119 P.
893, 894 (1911); Morris v. Vossler, 110 Cal. App. 2d 678, 682, 243 P.2d 43, 45 (1952);
Garrett v. Cook, 89 Cal. App. 2d 98, 103, 200 P.2d 21, 24 (1948); see Cavanaugh v.
Jackson, 91 Cal. 580, 583, 27 P. 931, 931 (1891); White v. Spreckels, 75 Cal. 610, 616,
17 P. 710, 717 (1888) (required parties to "fix and establish a boundary line. . . under
which they occupy ....").
137. E.g., Mello v. Weaver, 36 Cal. 2d 456, 461, 224 P.2d 691, 692 (1950);
Vowinckel v. N. Clark & Sons, 217 Cal. 258, 260, 18 P.2d 58, 59 (1933); Whealtey v.
San Pedro, Los Angeles & Salt Lake R.R., 169 Cal. 505, 514, 147 P. 135, 138 (1915);
Burris v. Fitch, 76 Cal. 395, 398, 18 P. 864, 865-66 (1888); Swartzbaugh v. Sargent, 30
Cal. App. 2d 467, 476, 86 P.2d 895, 899 (1939); Board of Trustees v. Miller, 54 Cal.
App. 102, 105, 201 P. 952, 953 (1921); Perich v. Maurer, 29 Cal. App. 293, 297, 155 P.
471, 472 (1915); see Columbet v. Pacheco, 48 Cal. 395, 397 (1874).
138. Carr v. Schomberg, 104 Cal. App. 2d '850, 232 P.2d 597 (1951); Needham v.
Collamer, 94 Cal. App. 2d 609, 211 P.2d 308 (1949).
139. 94 Cal. App. 2d 609, 211 P.2d 308 (1949).
140. Id. at 612, 211 P.2d at 310.
141. 104 Cal. App. 2d 850, 232 P.2d 597 (1951).
142. Id. at 859, 232 P.2d at 602.
143. Id.; Needham v. Collamer, 94 Cal. App. 2d 609, 612, 211 P.2d 308, 310 (1949).
Note that both cases involved agreed boundaries and not boundaries by acquiescence.
144. See generally notes 131-36 supra and accompanying text. Cf. note 137 supra
and accompanying text.
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ry.145  In Needham and Carr the courts found ample evidence to
establish the existence of agreed boundaries. 146 In light of such evi-
dence, it seems those courts believed that physical designation was
unnecessary. Therefore, Needham and Carr, though apparently relax-
ing the requirements, in reality simply recognized the true evidentiary
character and value of marking, possession, and improvements. Thus
these courts did not delineate physical marking as an element of the
doctrine of agreed boundaries.
Since Ernie neglected to discuss or require marking, occupation, or
improvements, most subsequent cases, citing Ernie as authority, fol-
lowed suit.147  A few cases, citing Carr and Needham as authority,"4 8
specifically held that marking of the line was unnecessary. 49 Some
cases, however, did not cite Ernie and instead used older cases to justify
the requirement of marking, occupation, or improvements. 150
Aborigine Lumber Co. v. Hyman,1'5 discussed the potential confu-
sion caused by the omission in Ernie.'52 The court observed that some
cases prior to Ernie demanded occupation,158 though it expressed doubt
that occupation was a requisite factor in every case. 154 It further noted
that although Ernie and certain other cases did not require occupation,
it was present in all those cases.' 55  The court neatly dealt with its
instant dilemma by pointing out that occupation was present in the case
before it.'56
145. See, e.g., note 137 supra and accompanying text.
146. Carr v. Schomberg, 104 Cal. App. 2d 850, 855, 232 P.2d 597, 602 (1951);
Needham v. Coelamer, 94 Cal. App. 2d 609, 610-11, 211 P.2d 308, 310 (1949).
147. E.g., Zachery v. McWilliams, 28 Cal. App. 3d 57, 60, 104 Cal. Rptr. 293, 294
(1972); Duncan v. Peterson, 3 Cal. App. 3d 607, 611, 83 Cal. Rptr. 744, 746 (1970);
McCormick v. Appleton, 225 Cal. App. 2d 591, 599, 37 Cal. Rptr. 544, 547 (1964);
Fobbs v. Smith, 202 Cal. App. 2d 209, 214, 20 Cal. Rptr. 545, 548 (1962).
148. See generally notes 138-46 supra and accompanying text.
149. Draus v. Griswold, 232 Cal. App. 2d 698, 711, 43 Cal. Rptr. 139, 146 (1965);
Rose v. Silva, 189 Cal. App. 2d 760, 767, 11 Cal. Rptr. 492, 496 (1961).
150. E.g., Vella v. Ratto, 17 Cal. App. 3d 737, 739, 95 Cal. Rptr. 72, 73 (1971);
Draemer v. Superior Oil Co., 240 Cal. App. 2d 642, 652, 49 Cal. Rptr. 869, 874 (1966);
Steele v. Shuler, 211 Cal. App. 2d 698, 704-05, 27 Cal. Rptr. 569, 572 (1963). But see
Minson Co. v. Aviation Finance, 38 Cal. App. 3d 489, 113 Cal. Rptr. 223 (1974),
which, though citing to Ernie, stated that the boundary "must be identifiable on the
ground." Id. at 495, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
151. 245 Cal. App. 2d 938, 54 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1966).







The discussion in Aborigine did little to solve the long-range prob-
lem. To eliminate this last remnant of confusion, the California Su-
preme Court should articulate what standard, if any, must be met with
respect to marking, possession or improvements. The court has a
substantial line of California cases on which to rely for guidance 5 and,
for further assistance, could examine out of state cases.
A majority of states agree that at least one of the following elements
must exist: physical designation of the agreed line, occupancy or posses-
sion to such line, or improvements up to the line.158  Seldom does a
state demand that all three elements be met, 59 and at times only one is
essential.' 60 A substantial number of states agree as to physical desig-
nation of the agreed line.' 0 ' A larger number require possession or
occupation to the agreed line.'6" Relatively few states insist upon
157. See generally notes 131-56 supra and accompanying text.
158. See notes 161-64 infra and accompanying text.
159. But see Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Patton, 344 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Civ. App.
1961).
160. E.g., Salter v. Cobb, 88 So. 2d 845, 849 (Ala. 1956) (possession); Kerrigan v.
Thomas, 281 So. 2d 410, 412-13 (Fla. App. 1973) (occupation); Davis v. Hansen, 224
N.W.2d 4, 6 (Iowa 1974) (marking); Wagner v. Thompson, 186 P.2d 278, 281 (Kan.
1947) (possession); Bemis v. Bradley, 139 A. 593, 594 (Me. 1927) (possession);
Natchez v. Vandervelde, 31 Miss. (2 Geo.) 706, 720 (1856) (actual possession);
Rautenberg v. Munnis, 226 A.2d 770, 772 (N.H. 1967) (occupation); Mazzucco v.
Eastman, 236 N.Y.S.2d 986, 990 (1960) (marking); LaFreniere v. Sprague, 271 A.2d
819, 821 (R.I. 1970) (actual possession); Klapman v. Hook, 32 S.E.2d 882, 884 (S.C.
1945) (occupation); Carstensen v. Brown, 236 P. 517, 520-21 (Wyo. 1925) (occupa-
tion). Cf. Osberg v. Murphy, 221 N.W.2d 4, 8 (S.D. 1974) (stated Wood v. Bapp, 169
N.W. 518, 522 (S.D. 1918) (dicta).
161. Edgeller v. Johnston, 262 P.2d 1006, 1010 (Idaho 1953); Davis v. Hansen, 224
N.W.2d 4, 6 (Iowa 1974); Turner v. Bowens, 203 S.W. 749, 751 (Ky. App. 1918);
Booker v. Wever, 202 N.W.2d 439, 442 (Mich. App. 1972); Townsend v. Koukol, 416
P.2d 523, 535 (Mont. 1966), citing inter alia, Roberts v. Brae, 5 Cal. 2d 356, 54 P.2d
698 (1936); Mazzucco v. Eastman, 236 N.Y.S.2d 986, 990 (1960); Beckman v. Metzger,
299 P.2d 152, 154 (Okla. 1956); Ogilvie v. Stackland, 179 P. 669, 670 (Ore. 1919);
Miles v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 91 A. 211, 212 (Pa. 1914); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v.
Patton, 344 S.W.2d 234, 235 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Baum v. Defa, 525 P.2d 725, 726
(Utah 1974); Lamm v. McTighe, 434 P.2d 565, 569 (Wash. 1967). See, e.g., Rabjohn
v. Ashcraft, 480 S.W.2d 138, 141 (Ark. 1972); Hartley v. Ruybal, 414 P.2d 114, 116
(Colo. 1966); Peacock v. Boatright, 146 S.E.2d 745, 747 (Ga. 1966); Amato v.
Haraden, 159 N.W.2d 907, 910 (Minn. 1968); Klaar v. Lemperis, 303 S.W.2d 55, 59
(Mo. 1947); Sceirine v. Densmore, 479 P.2d 779, 780 (Nev. 1971); Rodriguez v. La
Cueva Ranch Co., 134 P. 228, 233 (N.M. 1912); Trautman v. Ahlert, 147 N.W.2d 407,
411-12 (N.D. 1966); Nagel v. Philipsen, 90 N.W.2d 151, 153 (Wis. 1958) and cases
cited therein.
162. E.g., Peterson v. Hamilton, 237 So. 2d 100, 102 (Ala. 1970); Rabjohn v.
Ashcraft, 480 S.W.2d 138, 141 (Ark. 1972); Kerrigan v. Thomas, 281 So. 2d 410, 412-
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improvement or building up to the line.163  Those states which do not
specifically require one or all of these elements almost unanimously use
them as evidence of agreed boundaries.' 64 In only one state, Kentucky,
is the requirement of one of these elements eliminated." 6
This was done in Faulkner v. Lloyd 6 6 where the court attempted to
distinguish adverse possession, estoppel, and agreed boundaries.10
7  It
stated that possession up to the line was required only in adverse
possession cases, 166 but to establish an agreed boundary, it was "imma-
terial whether there has been any possession to the agreed line."' 0 At
least one older Kentucky case, however, used possession to support a
13 (Fla. App. 1973); Hartley v. Ruybal, 414 P.2d 114, 116 (Colo. 1966); Peacock v.
Boatright, 146 S.E.2d 745, 747 (Ga. 1966); Downing v. Boehringer, 349 P.2d 306, 308
(Idaho 1960); McLeod v. Lambdin, 174 N.E.2d 869, 871 (Ill. 1961); Bubacz v. Kirk,
171 N.E. 492, 494 (Ind. App. 1930); Steinhilber v. Holmes, 75 P. 1019, 1021 (Kan.
1904), citing Burris v. Fitch, 76 Cal. 395, 18 P. 864 (1888); Garvin v. Threlkeld, 190
S.W. 1092, 1093 (Ky. App. 1917); Faulkner v. Lloyd, 253 S.W.2d 972, 974 (Ky. App.
1952) (possession immaterial in agreed boundaries and relevant only as to adverse pos-
session) (see notes 166-72 infra and accompanying text); Bemis v. Bradley, 139 A. 593,
594 (Me. 1927); Amato v. Haraden, 159 N.W.2d 907, 910 (Minn. 1968); Natchez v.
Vandervelde, 31 Miss. (2 Geo.) 706, 720 (1856); Klaar v. Lemperis, 303 S.W.2d 55, 59
(Mo. 1957); Townsend v. Koukol, 416 P.2d 532, 535 (Mont. 1966); Sceirine v. Dens-
more, 479 P.2d 779, 780 (Nev. 1971); Rodriguez v. La Cueva Ranch Co., 134 P. 228,
233 (N.M. 1912); Rautenberg v. Munnis, 226 A.2d 770, 772 (N.H. 1967); Lewis v.
Smith, 103 P.2d 512, 514 (Okla. 1940); Thiessen v. Worthington, 68 P. 424, 424 (Ore.
1902); La Freniere v. Sprague, 271 A.2d 819, 821 (R.I. 1970); Klapman v. Hook, 32
S.E.2d 882, 884 (S.C. 1945); Wood v. Bapp, 169 N.W.2d 4, 8 (S.D. 1974) (dicta);
Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Patton, 344 S.W.2d 234, 236 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (in lieu of
improvements); Baum v. Defa, 525 P.2d 725, 726 (Utah 1974); Amey v. Hall, 181 A.2d
69, 72-73 (Vt. 1962) (constructive possession enough); Lamm v. MeTighe, 434 P.2d
565, 569 (Wash. 1967) (for boundary by acquiescence); Gwynn v. Schwartz, 9 S.E. 880,
885 (W. Va. 1889); Beduhn v. Kolar, 202 N.W.2d 272, 276 (Wis. 1972); Carstensen v.
Brown, 236 P. 517, 520-21 (Wyo. 1925); see Smith v. McKay, 30 Ohio St. 409, 417-18
(1876); Dimura v. Williams, 286 A.2d 370, 371 (Pa. 1972); Winborn v. Alexander, 279
S.W.2d 718, 26-27 (Tenn. App. 1955). But cf. Houston v. Matthews, 9 Tenn. 105,
107-08 (1826).
163. E.g., German v. Wilken, 37 N.E.2d 155, 158 (Ill. 1941); Humble Oil & Ref. Co.
v. Patton, 344 S.W.2d 234, 236 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (in lieu of actual possession or
use); Lamm v. MeTighe, 434 P.2d 565, 569 (Wash. 1967) (for boundary by acquiesc-
ence); see Kiker v. Anderson, 172 S.E.2d 835, 837 (Ga. 1970) (acquiescence by "acts
and declarations" of landowners); Bubacz v. Kirk, 171 N.E. 492, 494 (Ind. App. 1930);
Burt v. Creppel, 5 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 330, 331 (Superior Ct. 1875).
164. See, e.g., Rambeau v. Barrows, 225 A.2d 175, 178 (Vt. 1969).
165. See notes 166-69 infra and accompanying text.
166. 253 S.W.2d 972 (Ky. App. 1952).
167. Id. at 974.
168. Id.
169. Id., citing Howard v. Howard, 113 S.W.2d 434 (Ky. 1938).
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finding of an agreed boundary. 7 ' Thus, though it is clearly in the
minority,' 7 ' Faulkner may evidence the genesis of a more modern
law. 1
72
Such a modem approach to the issue of marking, possession, and
improvements is the best approach for the California courts to follow:
that is, marking, possession, and improvements should not be required
to be met as essential elements of the doctrine. Rather they should be
given the weight they merit and be used solely as evidence of an agreed
boundary. The most reasonable approach was taken by the court in
Carr which stated: "The test is whether the parties have agreed upon a
dividing line that is clear to them, and that can be made clear to
others."' 73  Although supported by slim case authority, 74 the logic of
this case cannot be denied. The very purpose of the doctrine of agreed
boundaries and boundaries by acquiescence is to facilitate the settlement
of boundary disputes. To accomplish this goal, as a minimum basic
requirement the court must find that the parties have agreed to a line. If
that line is evident or able to be made evident without marking, occupa-
tion, or improvement, a requirement of such would be excessive and
senseless. Although marking, occupation, and improvement up to such
line on the ground are common and simple means of evidencing such
agreement, they are not the only means.
The Ernie court appeared to recognize the exclusively evidentiary
value of physical manifestation of the agreed line. The court did not
require marking, occupation, or improvement as an element of the
doctrine it delineated but merely used their existence as persuasive
evidence of an agreed boundary.'7 5  Thus it implicitly held that as long
as the essential elements were satisfied, 76 and if the agreed line was
clear to all concerned, even without marking, possession, or improve-
ment, it should become the boundary.
170. Garvin v. Threlkeld, 190 S.W. 1092, 1093 (Ky. App. 1917).
171. See notes 158-64 supra and accompanying text. Note that most of the states not
listed above have no cases dealing with this area.
172. Since no cases subsequently cited Faulkner, it is possible that it was a fluke,
especially as it was decided by an appellate court rather than by the Kentucky Supreme
Court.
173. 104 Cal. App. 2d 850, 859, 232 P.2d 597, 602 (1951). See notes 142-43 supra
and accompanying text.
174. Id., citing Needham v. Collamer, 94 Cal. App. 2d 609, 211 P.2d 308 (1949). See
notes 139-42 supra and accompanying text.
175. 51 Cal. 2d 702, 708, 336 P.2d 525, 528-29 (1959).
176. Id. at 707, 336 P.2d at 528. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
Generally, the doctrine of agreed boundaries led a confused existence.
It was variously misapplied, misinterpreted, or ignored. It was used to
justify both equitable and inequitable decisions. 77 It baffled courts and
commentators alike.'
7 8
The California Supreme Court recognized the futility of propogating
a doctrine so confusing that its value was almost nil. Thus in Ernie v.
Trinity Lutheran Church, the court tried to create order from the chaos.
Basing its decision on solid authority, 179 the court clearly enunciated the
requirements by which an agreed boundary or boundary by acquies-
cence is to be determined. s0  There must be uncertainty between coter-
minous owners as to the true location of the boundary,' 8' an agreement
to settle such uncertainty, 8 2 and an acquiescence in the line for the
period required by the statute of limitation or under such circumstances
that substantial loss would result if the boundary were not upheld. 8
Though not specifically overruling past cases to the contrary, the
inference from Ernie is that those cases are no longer valid. Subse-
quently, almost all California cases have used Ernie as a basis for
decision.8 4 There are a minority of cases, however, which did not.8 5
Although Ernie substantially delineated a logical and practical doc-
trine, it left a small residue of ambiguity in its wake' s" by neglecting to
discuss whether marking, possession, or improvement were essential
177. E.g., Roman v. Ries, 259 Cal. App. 2d 65, 70, 66 Cal. Rptr. 120, 123 (1960);
Buza v. Wojtalewicz, 180 N.W.2d 556, 561 (Wis. 1970).
178. E.g., Janes v. LeDeit, 228 Cal. App. 2d 474, 39 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1964); Lewis v.
Smith, 103 P.2d 512, 513 (Okla. 1940). See generally Kirkegaard v. McLain, 199 Cal.
App. 2d 484, 18 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1962); Browder, supra note 2; Boundary Litigation,
supra note 3.
179. Ernie based its decision almost exclusively on California Supreme Court cases.
E.g., Mello v. Weaver, 36 Cal. 2d 456, 459, 224 P.2d 691, 693 (1950); Martin v. Lopes,
28 Cal. 2d 618, 622-27, 170 P.2d 881, 884-86 (1946); Hannah v. Pogue, 23 Cal. 2d 849,
856-57, 147 P.2d 572, 576 (1944); Nusbickel v. Stevens Ranch Co., 187 Cal. 15, 19, 200
P. 651, 651-52 (1921); Silva v. Azevedo, 178 Cal. 495, 173 P. 292, 292 (1918);
Price v. De Reyes, 161 Cal. 484, 489, 119 P. 893, 894 (1911); Young v. Blakeman, 153
Cal. 477, 481-83, 95 P. 888, 890 (1908).





184. See notes 64, 93 and 122 supra and accompanying text.
185. See generally notes 65, 97-105 and 150 supra and accompanying text.
186. See note 128 supra and accompanying text.
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elements or merely evidentiary tools.' 8 7  This is the last bastion of
agreed boundaries. 188 When the California Supreme Court is presented
the opportunity to resolve this question, ideally it will continue to permit
the Ernie flexibility and hold that such acts, though acceptable as
evidence, are not essential to create an agreed boundary. Until such
decision, Ernie is the most recent and authoritative statement of the
doctrine in California. In order to justly resolve boundary disputes,
Ernie must be followed by the California courts.
Janice Patronite
187. Id.
188. See, e.g., notes 150-52 supra and accompanying text.
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